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Reading Chapter One, Part Two of 
Papadiamantes’s Th e Merchants of 
the Nations
Dimitris Vardoulakis
Th is article examines one chapter in Papadiamantes’s novel Th e Merchants of the 
Nations under the rubric of a logic of confession.
Th e chapter which will be analysed here contains a scene of confession. Th e term 
“confession” should be understood here as an address to God. Th is means that 
a confession is not to be confused with either an admission of guilt, or with the 
“return of the repressed” in psychoanalysis (Reik, 1959). Th e canonical example 
of a confession as an address to God is Augustine’s Confessions.1 In Augustine, the 
conception of God is given in relation to time yielding an existential defaultness 
of the human. Th ere is a temporality which yields a logic of confession as well as 
an ontology of man. Augustine raises the issue of time in Book XI. Th ere, time is 
explicitly related to God: “You have made time itself ” (XI, xiii, 15). To put this the 
other way round, God, properly speaking, has no time: “In the eternal, nothing is 
transient, but the whole is present” (XI, xi, 13). Th e absence of time leads to a con-
ception of God as that nothing which encompasses everything. Th e upshot of this 
view is that, in a strict sense, the human only knows the present: “If future and past 
events exist, I want to know where they are. If I have not the strength to discover 
1 This is not to equate the confessional scenes in Papadiamantes and Augustine. There are two 
important differences between the two confessions. First, Augustine explicitly addresses God, he 
confesses to God who is absent at least to the extent of never responding. On the contrary, the 
scene of confession in Papadiamantes is between persons, one of whom can directly and unequivo-
cally bestow forgiveness. Second, what is examined in Papadiamantes’s novel is an event whose 
historicity is determined by the participants. Conversely, Augustine’s work also participates in the 
complex network of relations that its own genre — the genre of autobiography — demands. It is 
the very confessional nature of writing that Lyotard emphasises: “Not memory, then, but the said 
inner human, who is neither man nor woman, an outside inside. This is the only witness of the 
presence of the Other, of the other of Presence. A singular witness, the poem” (Lyotard, 2000:7). 
However, regardless of the complexities that those differences introduce, it could still be argued 
they both partake of what will be called a “logic of confession”.
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the answer, at least I know that wherever they are [i.e. wherever they are from the 
human perspective], they are not there as future or past, but as present” (XI, xviii, 
23). Th e fate of mankind is given in temporal terms as its fated presentifi cation 
radically divorced from past and future — yet, at the same time, not only being able 
to conceive of past and future, but also needing them in order for the defaultness to 
be expressed. Th is interplay between the eternal and the present is what comprises 
for Jean-François Lyotard the unique message of Augustine’s confession: “chronos, 
at once and in its eternity, consists in delay” (Lyotard, 2000:17). What Augustine’s 
text testifi es to, according to Lyotard, is precisely this human lagging behind, the 
impossibility of a fi rm grasp in and of time. All of Lyotard’s fi nal and unfi nished 
work revolves around this point. Waiting as the feature of the present is consist-
ently problematised because of its dependence on the past and on the future which 
nevertheless must remain prohibited to it: 
Th e Confessions are written under the temporal sign of waiting. Waiting is the name of 
the consciousness of the future. But here, because it is a question not only of confessing 
faith in an end that awaits, that lies in suff erance, but of confessing the self, of display-
ing the suff erance of what has been done, waiting must go back through the past, climb 
back to its source, the upstream of this faith, toward the life that has been unhappy, 
toward the work that it once was (Lyotard, 2000:70). 
Past and future remain prohibited because they remain God’s properties and the 
God addressed in the Confessions does not respond: “you never calls me you in 
turn” (Lyotard, 2000:75). Four points about a logic of the confession are gleaned 
from the discussion of Augustine. First, the present is the only time accessible to 
man. Second, the past and the future are ruptured from the time within which the 
human exists. Th ree, while past and future must be rejected from that which is 
human, a logic of confession still needs to associate those temporalities with the 
human. Th is yields a notion of constitutive defaultness of man — man as lacking 
a future. Finally, four, to the extent that forgiveness is guaranteed by God, time is a 
property of the divine.
*   *   *
Alexandros Papadiamantes’s novel Οἱ ἔμποροι τῶν ἐθνῶν (Th e Merchants of the 
Nations, 1882–83) ends rather spectacularly. A dark night in the thirteenth century 
is suddenly illuminated by the burning Venetian fl eet laying siege to the castle of 
Naxos in the Cyclades. However, the spectacle of the fi re is of secondary impor-
tance. Th e ploy of the Venetian general, Sanoutos, burning the fl eet so that his 
captains could not desert him is peripheral. As is that Sanoutos’ lover, Augousta 
or Agape, unaware of his scheme, is trapped in the fl aming fl agship. Central is the 
male fi gure on the shore, witnessing the burning. His name was Ioannis Mouchras, 
presently known as Vendikis, Augousta’s husband who had saved Sanoutos from 
pirates, only for the Venetian to desecrate his hospitality by stealing his wife. Just 
before the auto-da-fé is complete, the sinful wife notices her husband on the beach 
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and he notices her. “She made a gesture of both farewell and entreaty to him 
[...] and cried out hoping to be heard: ‘Ioanni, my husband, forgive me!’ ‘I forgive 
you with all my soul’, replied Ioannis, understanding the gesture. And the fl ames 
engulfed her” (340).2 Th e climactic pathos of this adventure romance could not 
but off end contemporary sensibilities. However, this novel is still of interest today 
because of a startling discourse on forgiveness during Augousta’s confession in the 
middle of the book.
Prior to examining the confessional scene, it has to be asked what is involved in 
a confession. A confession is not so much a conversation between two people, as 
it is a dialogue which has a particular temporality. And if this temporality indexes 
the present and the past of the parties involved, its temporal register is also insist-
ently futural. Th e whole purpose of the confession is concentrated in the declara-
tion “I forgive you!” Yet, it is still unclear whose time is the time of confession. To 
raise the issue of “belonging” is far from peripheral or arbitrary to the meaning of 
the confession. “Belonging” is ineliminable in confession for three reasons which 
disclose three types of belonging vis-à-vis time and which establish the partici-
pant’s individuality. First, a confession requires individuals who are involved in a 
pre-determined system of legal, political, personal, theological, and hermeneutical 
relations. And for those relations to determine the parties as distinct individuals, 
the relations must give to each one some property, there is a belonging in general 
to each individual. Second, a confessional secret is something unique to one of the 
individuals, a present knowledge or experience that no-one else shares. Th is non-
knowledge could not be claimed by anyone else making it a belonging of the con-
fessee. In the confessing act of the confession, that singular belonging of the secret 
is off ered to the other. Th ird, the declaration “I absolve you!”, that is, the utterance 
that ushers in the parties as witnesses to the future, is something whose guarantor 
is the confessor. In this remarkable act, the confessor becomes a confessee — but 
not of a past personal experience, instead he confesses of the future sin-free life of 
the other. Surely, aft er the declaration, that vision of the future belongs to both par-
ties, but prior to that the experience belonged only to the confessor, it was a singu-
lar experience. Th is futural declaration, then, repeats the two previous belongings: 
the general intersubjective one and the secret of a unique experience. For this rea-
son this declaration can be taken as a second confession in itself, the only diff erence 
being that the futural belonging of forgiveness is never now, it is always a moment 
later. Th e notion of belonging that is inscribed in the event facilitates the separation 
of the two individuals, their unique properties, and thus makes possible the event 
itself. Belonging refers to the individual qua individuality, it is what constitutes the 
participants as distinct entities with distinct roles in a confession.
Since the distinctness of the individuals through time has to be maintained 
for confessionality to make sense, it is still perplexing that what the confessor 
2 All references to Papadiamantes, 1997 are given by page number parenthetically in the text.
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guarantees in the future — forgiveness or absolution — is something that singu-
larly belongs to the other. Th us, the distinctness between the two individuals starts 
to blur. Even the temporality of that utterance — “I absolve you!” — can no longer 
be self-evident. Maybe it belongs to a combination of those temporal registers. 
Maybe it fi nds a balance or equilibrium between past, present and future. In which 
case, it is the measure of the price of belonging, it is the economical currency of 
the belonging of confession. However, for this currency to come into circulation, 
the distinctness of the individuals has already been staked. Th e question, then, is 
whether this distinctness can now, après coup, be redeemed. Th is question, which is 
not simply monetary since the currency pertains to the human’s salvation, strikes at 
the heart of Alexandros Papadiamantes’s novel, Th e Merchants of the Nations. Th is is 
evidenced from the very beginning, by the title itself. It refers to “the merchants of 
the nations”, even though there are no business transactions in the novel, there are 
no merchants as such. Th e title in fact refers to national predilections of weighing 
or measuring the human’s salvation — an emporium of the soul’s redeemability.3 
Th ere is, on the one hand, the attitude of the Venetian Sanoutos, which gives weight 
to the calling of his fl esh, to his present sexual desire. Conversely, the good Greek 
nobleman Mouchras or Vendikis is leading his life according to moral precepts. 
Augousta is wavering, unable to decide what is weightier: her desire for Sanoutos, 
or her moral obligation towards her honourable and legitimate husband. Her plight 
dramatises the valorisation of present desire versus futural redemption.
Th is dramatisation is nowhere more pronounced than in the confession scene 
in the fi rst chapter of the second part of the novel. Augousta has left  Sanoutos and 
sought refuge at the monastery on Patmos, becoming sister Agape. One Sunday 
she summons abbot Ammoun to her cell to confess. Her confession starts with 
a caveat: “Whoever narrates his life and speaks at length about his suff erings and 
sins, always lies, because of necessity he talks about his own self ” (227).4 Th is is not 
3 This is not say that I disagree with Triantafyllopoulos’s assertion that “the main topic [of the novel] 
is money” (Triantafyllopoulos, 2003:217). Rather, the issue of money introduces of necessity a vari-
ety of other issues, such as ethics, identity, theology and so on. Triantafyllopoulos seems to allude 
to this a few lines later, when he assert that in the title “the ‘nations’ is objective genitive of the 
‘merchants’”.
4 Although a psychological approach will inevitably be reductive, what may be discerned in this 
caveat is possibly a resentment of confession. Such a resentment may be prompted by a confession 
that Augousta made at the very beginning of the novel (158–60), just aft er meeting Sanoutos for 
the fi rst time. However, that confession could not stem her desire for the Venetian. It is not possible 
here to off er a synoptic view of the scenes of confession in Papadiamantes’s oeuvre. However, an 
additional example from his early work can be mentioned briefl y. It comes from Papadiamantes’s 
next novel, Th e Gypsy Girl. Th ere, a Catholic nun uses confession as a ruse to fi nd what the protago-
nist, Aima, has in her mind. Th is may indicate that Papadiamantes persists in being sceptical about 
confession, or it may indicate Papadiamantes’s aversion to the Catholic Church. Whatever the case, 
the most remarkable feature of this confession is that the confessor turns into the confessee. Th is 
indistinction of personal boundaries is of immense importance in Th e Merchants of the Nations, as 
will be shown shortly. Th is turning in Th e Gypsy Girl is described thus: “Her [the Catholic nun’s] 
Vardoulakis, Dimitris 2007. Reading Chapter One, Part Two of Papadiamantes's "The Merchant of the Nations". In E. Close, M. Tsianikas 
and G. Couvalis (eds.) "Greek Research in Australia: Proceedings of the Sixth Biennial International Conference of Greek Studies, 
Flinders University June 2005", Flinders University Department of Languages - Modern Greek: Adelaide, 275-282.
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
READING CHAPTER ONE, PART TWO OF PAPADIAMANTES’S THE MERCHANTS OF THE NATIONS
279
a customary way to augment a confession. Whereas a confession presupposes the 
distinctness of the individual, and hence the remembering of a personal experience 
that burdens the individual, here Agape explicitly denies that it is possible to deter-
mine that which belongs singularly to the individual constituting its individuality. 
From the moment that individuality is supposed to be formed by a personal recall 
(a remembered unique experience), the narration becomes of necessity aberrant. 
Talking about the individual, contends Agape, can be nothing but a lie. In other 
words, what is denied is the possibility that one can recount that experience (the 
secret belonging) which calls for forgiveness. Aft er this remarkable opening, Agape 
confesses that she was in fact physically content while she was with Sanoutos, and 
that she only “was deceiving herself and everybody else” because “her sorrow was 
hypocritical” (227). Th at experience, then, an experience of desire and passion, was 
thoroughly hypocritical. Not that the desire itself was feigned; rather, the truthful-
ness of the desire could only present itself hypocritically.
Ammoun hears her “as if in ecstasy”. Many thoughts rush into his mind. “First of 
all,” Ammoun thinks, “was this a confession? But if it was, it was altogether unlike 
any usual confession that he had heard in his whole long forty years in the profes-
sion” (229). Th e complete novelty of Agape’s confession leads Ammoun’s thoughts 
in the opposite direction to Agape. He refl ects that, if this is a confession, then 
every other “confession” he has heard in forty years was not really a confession. For, 
even considering his own confessions, he could never recall a single one that was 
completely “unhypocritically honest” (229). Suddenly, Agape’s confession is instead 
considered as no ordinary confession, because it is a truly honest confession. Th e 
hypocrisity, in its doubling up, now functions as a double negation — a positive. An 
admission of the impossibility of not lying constitutes the hyper-truth that could 
ever be confessed and that always has been and will be confessed. Th e only true 
confession is not a non-lie. However, Ammoun realises that he cannot convey those 
musings to Agape, because they would instantly, in the present, “change over posi-
tion” and she would have become his confessor (230). In that case, their individuali-
ties will merge, their distinctness will dissolve. Moreover, the confession itself will 
be dissolved within the dissolution of the participants’ individuality.
Th ere is no doubt that, from a certain perspective, Agape and Ammoun espouse 
diametrically diff erent positions. Whereas Agape insists on the ungraspable vagran-
cies of her uniquely personal experience, Ammoun contemplates his own profes-
sional experience in the institutional practice of confession. Th us, for Agape, her 
past uniqueness prohibits her from off ering the secret of her confession in the 
present, because that would entail the elimination of the contingency of her past 
experience, it would deny embodiment to her past. Ammoun, conversely, perceives 
aim at the beginning was to convince the girl that she had to confess so that she would act as her 
confessor. [...] But she has not imagined that from interrogator she was going to fi nd herself in the 
position of the interrogated [ἀπὸ ἀνακρίτριας νὰ περιέλθει εἰς τὴν θέσιν τῆς ἐξεταζομένης]” (518).
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every confessing — every confession that is not the “usual” kind but a true confes-
sion — as the enactment in the present of the same scene, namely of the honesty 
of the confession in its hypocrisity. For the former, there is nothing but the secret, 
while for the latter, there is anything but a secret. For Agape, particularity will 
for ever remain secretive because it is ungraspable in its incessant changing. For 
Ammoun there is no secret because the whole of humanity is only given by default, 
in its sinful apposition to the sinless God. However, despite all variation, they both 
partake of an essential sameness. Th is is not to say that they are the same. Rather, 
their partaking of an essential sameness indicates that sameness as such, in its 
proper formality, regulates the thought process of both the nun and the abbot.
In other words, they partake of a common logic. A logic which is intent on 
keep ing sameness. In particular, the sameness of the individuals involved in confes-
sion. Th is is a logical function because it sustains the distinctness of the individual 
through the course of time. Th is is the logic of confession. Why, then, is it that, 
despite both Agape and Ammoun’s urge to confess, neither is able to do so? It will 
appear that what disturbs the logic is the notion of distinct individuality, which 
is nevertheless required and presupposed by the logic. Th e individual in its dis-
tinctness cannot be allowed, without bending the rules of the logic, to refer to the 
future — cannot say “I forgive you!” If there is such a debilitating and auto-destruc-
tive force to the future, then what has to be examined is the notion of belonging 
which, as already intimated, makes individuality possible. On the one hand, there 
is the general belonging which indicates the insertion of the individual in a web of 
institutional relations — Ammoun’s “forty years in the profession”. Such a belong-
ing is plural. On the other hand, the belonging of the secret is singular. Th is is the 
belonging that exercises Agape, who justifi ably protests that her unique experience 
cannot be presented truthfully. Agape and Ammoun’s positions have three struc-
tural elements in common. First, in relation to past and present, they both privilege 
only one side of belonging — either only the plural or only the singular. Second, 
it follows that the future announced by the “I forgive you!” will also have to be 
grasped one-sidedly. For Agape, forgiveness in general is impossible because the 
vision of the future can never be in accord with her own singular experience. For 
Ammoun, personal forgiveness is impossible because a true confession is only the 
rehearsal of the same double negation. In both cases, the lack of a distinct vision of 
the future instils a constitutive fault in the distinct individual. Th ird, consequently, 
they both draw an existential conclusion about the defaultness of the human.
However, what is it that legitimates such an existential conclusion? Who can 
authorise the pronouncement of such a defaultness? Th e answer of both Agape 
and Ammoun would have to be: what legitimates and authorises such a conclusion 
is what we have just witnessed. Namely, the emergence of our individuality — be 
it constituted in the singular or in the plural — which now, in the present, in the 
event of its presentifi cation, is found in default. “We” — here Agape and Ammoun 
are joint in one voice — “we are the actualisation of that state”. But, immediately, 
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a dilemma emerges: is this one voice singular or plural? How can Agape raise her 
voice in conjunction with Ammoun, without contaminating her treasured singular-
ity? And how can Ammoun raise his own voice at all without reiterating something 
that has already been said and which therefore is not his own at all? So it transpires 
that, although they may have joint voices, they nevertheless mean very diff erent 
things. In which case, closer attention will have to be paid to exactly what they 
mean when they say “we are the actualisation of that state”.
Now, as was shown a moment ago, the sameness that sustains the distinctness 
of individuality has to be something formal. It is the formality of identity giving, 
not each individuated identity. Th is formal sameness dictated that, for individual 
distinctness to be maintained, the future is in default because no vision of it can be 
provided. Th us, when Agape says that “I myself actualise here and now that state of 
default”, she actually means that her own singular future cannot be given. Whilst 
Ammoun may be saying the same thing, he actually means that the future cannot 
be given to him because it is only ever plural. Th e former’s premise is singularity, 
the latter’s is plurality. But both premises are part of a logic that demands the exis-
tential conclusion according to which there is absolutely no image of the future. Yet, 
at the same time, it seems impossible to observe such a strict prohibition against 
the future. Aft er all, a moment later, they can repeat the same pronouncement. It 
appears impossible to pronounce this existential defaultness, in the present, without 
alluding to the future, and thereby blatantly lapsing into self-contradiction. Th e 
logic of the confession, the logic of sameness, has reached its limit.
Papadiamantes re-visited this limit in the memorable ending of Th e Murderess. 
Just like Th e Merchants of the Nations, Th e Murderess ends with a scene of death 
at the sea. Hadoula is drowned pursued by police while she is trying to cross over 
to the church on a small island in order to confess her sins. Th us, there is no con-
fession here, nor any forgiveness. Papadiamantes explicitly states that Hadoula 
perished “between divine and human justice” (Papadiamantes, 1989:520). Th is sta-
tement should be read as an admonition against the possibility of a witness who 
will adjudicate between divine and human justice. Papadiamantes repeats the scene 
of judgement from the earlier novel but without the bestowal of forgiveness. Th e 
reworking of this old scene allows for a future to come into play in the interval 
between the human and the divine (cf. Vardoulakis, 2005).
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